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Preservation of the ASEAN Regionalism: Responding to the Belt Road Initiative as the 
New ‘Carrot or Stick’ Policies1 
Hino Samuel Jose2 
Abstract 
The increasing China’s geopolitical and economic influence through BRI has impacted the global 
development landscape. The rising implementation of BRI in Eurasia, Africa, and Asia-Pacific has 
surrounded Europe and its Western counterparts into a new durability test against their regionalism. ASEAN 
as the unique strategic region in the emerging Asia Pacific is now being challenged with the presence of 
BRI and how can it impact the regional political and cooperation architecture. The carrot or stick approach 
that has been used by many scholars to perceive western Marshall Plan seemed to be reignited reflecting 
from China’s trade war with Australia and the other countries. This article discusses the way ASEAN could 
navigate its regionalism amid the rising China’s influence in post-RCEP adoption. Learning from Africa, 
ASEAN should be able to preserve its way and institutionalization of its regime in order to last amid the 
increased China’s political economy influence in Southeast Asia through BRI. The implementation of BRI 
has also been impacting ASEAN efforts on South China Sea and Myanmar Crisis, which will open the 
question on how to play ASEAN way into its best role in Asia Pacific as the rising power.  
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Introduction  
The global community cannot deny that the Asia Pacific is now becoming the emerging powerhouse 
of the new international political economy landscape. The mainstream study of ‘state transformation’ 
for instance has been mainstreaming the emerging power dynamics in today’s scholarly debates 
(Hameiri & Jones, 2019). China as the rising global contemporary power implements its political 
economy strategies to strengthen its influence in and beyond the Asia Pacific through a new solution 
in pursuing growth. That particular solution as discussed by Hameiri and Jones (2016) is by 
penetrating their Chinese way of economic influence in transnational products and investment 
networks (Hameiri & Jones, 2016). This solution, called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is the 
investment of a multibillion-dollar projects that were placed from Asia to Africa to increase China’s 
economic connectivity and value-added political economy. The BRI projects in Africa alone, for 
instance, increased drastically since Covid-19 at a rate of 5.2% with the value of 132 billion USD in 
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11 years span (2006-2017) (Ukpe, 2020). This could be seen as China’s unilateral movement to 
challenge the world’s renowned economic development principles which were called as “Washington 
Consensus” or WC that was developed by the US and the starting point where the new developmental 
paradigm (Kennedy, 2010). The WC itself was embraced as the model for countries to developing 
their own economy through foreign aids and loans that are being channeled by Bretton-woods 
financial institution, while the Beijing Consensus (BC) relied more into unilateral policy and 
embracing the multi-polarity of ideas (Jarso, 2018). 
The rising power of the “Beijing Consensus” is now imminent with enormous government 
intervention that is motivated to outnumber the western’s influence over the regional political 
economy landscape (Vangeli, 2019). As we know, western financial aid also comes with the rules 
where the debtor government should restrict their macroeconomic policies to ensure that the debt is 
well targeted and managed as part of the debtor’s accountability (Shelton & Kebemba, 2012). On the 
other hand, BRI is more lenient and respecting the national macroeconomic policies’ sovereignty, 
which made BRI under the BC consensus tend to be favorable for those states that wouldn’t want to 
hustle themselves. The ASEAN regional political economy landscape currently is in need of FDI and 
foreign financial assistance as the region itself doesn’t acquire the supranational power to collectively 
fund each country, this made BRI tend to be favorable in the region. However, the rising China power 
through BRI is disliked by Japan, along with the historic rival of China – Shinzo Abe argued in 2016 
that BRI’s financing through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is not transparent and 
carefully assessed (Bhagawati, 2016). Although Japan challenged it and swore to reform Asian 
Development Bank, DIP. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) to challenge AIIB shortly in terms 
of development financing, the nexus between development-geopolitics-anti western notion can be 
concluded as the reconfiguration of China’s expansionist strategy. This expansion is complemented 
by flexible financing and easier mechanisms which made countries targeted by China’s BRI felt 
heavy enough to reject the offer, unlike the western strict OECD financing (Garlick, 2020). This 
multi-faceted and pragmatic approach makes BRI more promising compared to the historic Marshall 
Plan, while it also enhances Chinese land trade connectivity with the continued support from Chinese 
banks to Europe by utilizing the strategic economic corridor line (Hoque & Tama, 2020).  
Methodology 
This brief is analyzed through a qualitative analysis that was based on document-based and internet-
based research from secondary data source. This paper is discussing the issues and contexts guided 
by the following research questions: (1) How can ASEAN perceive BRI as it can be perceived as the 
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new carrot or stick policy; (2) What are the matters of regional disintegration caused by China’s geo-
economics and geopolitical interests; and (3) What ASEAN can expect from their regional dilemma? 
These questions pretty much guide the research in deliberating further the analysis in this brief. 
BRI as the New China’s ‘Carrot or Stick’ Foreign Policy 
When it comes to the discourse of Chinese foreign policy, Tianxia, or “everything below the sky” has 
to become the main driver of China’s perspective in perceiving global affairs (Mingming, 2012). The 
implementation of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) is now being seen as a progressive Tianxia 
construction of China’s geopolitical interest in increasing connectivity of China with the other 70 
targeted countries (Korwa, 2019). The increasing Chinese grasp within Africa and Asia has shown 
the signal that this effort has allowed China to redefine its bilateral relationship into a more ideal 
atmosphere suited to its political and socio-economic goals (Kavalski, 2009). BRI is also the single 
powerful Chinese riffle that can shoot bullets to its western alliance counterparts without opening a 
direct risky confrontation, while at the same time colluding with other states to exclude western’s 
presence (Fels, 2017). This however will be another political and economic issue for ASEAN to thrive 
with its well-known complex regional principles. The absence of supranational authority in each 
ASEAN member state made enforcement and political solutions tend to rely more upon 
interdependence relations intertwined with the subject that being played on.  
BRI can be perceived with the ‘carrot or stick’ approach by ASEAN learning from what happened in 
Africa. Through BRI, countries can acquire multi-million dollar infrastructure and investment 
projects, which will support the agenda of domestic development. In political science, the carrot or 
stick approach is perceived by the realist/ liberal thought as the means to influence a particular actor/ 
side to the direction of the actors with hard power abilities (Thayer, 2006). The implementation of 
carrot or stick has been the key solution used by major powers to achieve their agenda, for example, 
the EU tends to use the carrot-or-stick approach when dealing with human rights/ sustainability issues 
with other states – and same for the US when they are excluding Iran in the global supply chain 
(Akcay & Kanat, 2017). On BRI, the carrot or stick approach can be used when deconstructing the 
practices of BRI’s investment in Asia and Africa when China slammed heavy tariff to Australia’s 
export to China as its response to Aussie’s cancellation of BRI’s MoU in Victoria in April 2021 
(Wood, 2021; Khaliq, 2021).  
These events have reflected the true nature of carrot or stick, and as argued by Johnson (2018), 
China’s BRI targets have been always directed to the least developing countries with tremendous 
unrealized development potentials (Johnson, 2018). The problem is that most of these African states 
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are struggling with political crisis, massive corruption, and bad governance – and it is irrational from 
a holistic view for states like China to keep investing without even expecting any payback. This 
investment seems to be a carrot for African states’ development, however, with them unable to repay 
the debt, they must trade their strategic ports and mining locations to be handed over to China. This 
kind of exchange is a “stick” hitting the African countries, and many western countries argued that 
this debt-trap diplomacy has prolonged another nightmare and not bringing sustainable prosperity 
(Dianjaya, 2019).  
ASEAN Regionalism Preservation: A View and Dilemma From Within 
Speaking with an inward-looking approach, ASEAN is a prone region, and the way of consensus-
building became the main driver of the region’s decision making. However, it doesn’t include a way 
for ASEAN to prevent several overlooked issues like foreign intervention from non-ASEAN actors 
within the intra-regional affairs.  ASEAN did come up with an answer when in 2016, ASEAN 
Adopted the Outlook on Indo-Pacific, which laid down the fundamental stipulations of ASEAN's new 
spirit to develop their regional ecosystem against contemporary challenges (Scott, 2019). The 
contention of China-US rivalry, the increased changes between ASEAN member inter-state relations, 
and Indonesia’s growing role as the spearhead in ASEAN made regional instability imminent 
(Siahaan & Risman, 2020). However, the incorporated Chinese geopolitics in ASEAN have made it 
harder for ASEAN regionalism to prevail for a more firm stance against China’s influence. For 
instance, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam tend to be more closer towards China – while Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore tried to pursue a stronger clause against China’s 
intervention.. To understand this further, on the question of Myanmar for instance, China’s strong 
interest in Myanmar’s industries and the adjacent important geostrategy of China’s connectivity to 
the Indian Ocean Regio via Myanmar did affect the way ASEAN states interact on political issues. 
Myanmar need a more democratic solutions, but the aforementioned pressing matter on China’s 
geostrategic importance made Burma’s neighbor like Vietnam and Thailand to becoming more 
reluctant to pursue stronger democratic solutions for Myanmar 2021 crisis. Vietnam and Thailand are 
China’s strategic trade and political partner, and their ties with China made their stance to be softer 
than and not as hardcore as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia because they were evading from 
colliding with Beijing. These “turbulences” are now being “exacerbated” by China’s growing BRI 
influence in Myanmar as the country needs more infrastructure until up to 9 billion USD in total 
(Hiebert, 2020). A tangible proof to describe this issue was the adopted 5 point consensus on 
Myanmar that seems weaker than expected by the public community. The consensus did not imply 
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any clause about foreign intervention, like what China did, and it also did not stipulate a firm 
democratic restoration that has been demanded by the people of Myanmar on their protests (Lee, 
2021). Foreign intervention in Myanmar as we know will just worsen the condition as people’s core 
issues can’t be alleviated.  
What ASEAN should expect is a prolonged stagnancy in the region with an increased role of China 
in Southeast Asia architecture, especially after the adoption of the RCEP. It isworthy to note that 
China was the first country that completed its RCEP ratification, even faster than Indonesia as the 
spearheader. The BRI is the key to answer the infrastructure development gap and to promote hyper-
efficient infrastructure projects that cater to promising innovations, and this has made China became 
the strategic partner of 128 countries in the world. ASEAN, in reality, needs Chinese investment in 
BRI projects across the region because the unique geographic characteristics and its trade 
commonalities need China’s BRI to achieve their ASEAN Masterplan on Connectivity/ MPAC (Chia, 
2016). This is feasible if there is no protectionist posture that might surface against the flow of BRI’s 
funding and noteworthy impact on domestic fiscal policies that are being incorporated with BRI 
funding (Foo et al, 2019). ASEAN has one dilemma, where ASEAN should be careful when opening 
their doorstep towards an external entity, because the more dependent ASEAN towards that particular 
entity, the harder it is to centralize ASEAN role. This is because the region will be unable to take a 
firm stance and feasible solutions as the regional stance will be disintegrated and divided by foreign 
hands. These kinds of disintegrated interests caused by foreign dependencies might struck the 
consensus-building and mutual trust among others to keep believing in ASEAN way. Especially with 
the fact that ASEAN cannot apply its minus X mechanism in a political matter, which means full 
consensus is required for any regional norm-setting process. 
What should be done to preserve ASEAN regionalism? 
ASEAN should be able to imply strategic political measures, and this will be obscured by tremendous 
China’s Tianxia policy. This kind of Tianxia, which was manifested through BRI, will become the 
key benchmark where China is able to embed Chinese foreign policy traditional historic vision in the 
changing global world order. It is worthy enough to be considered that this will weaken the ASEAN 
way of regionalism in moving forward to achieve its 2025 community blueprint. This will become 
imminent if ASEAN is no longer struggling for a more top-down approach to learning from another 
region. The BRI that has successfully bridged Asia and Europe through the Eurasia region is now 
being concerned by the Western European counterparts as China already knocked their front yard, 
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and ASEAN is now also struggling to enforce China to the ASEAN way game in the South China 
Sea and other high political issues. 
Back to the carrot or stick notion, ASEAN should reconsider its role as a bridgebuilder in the new 
international setting as any attempt to strike China’s financial means might result in another 
diplomatic headache with China. The carrot given by China will just be another stick that also 
devastates ASEAN efforts in resolving direct issues with China (for instance in the SCS). ASEAN 
cannot become a bridgebuilder as the rising regional power in the world of post-RCEP because 
China’s grasp within the BRI in ASEAN will just show the world that ASEAN is incapable of 
handling its region – and how can it even handle a larger mega-trade agreement? However, ASEAN 
can still gain great momentum as BRI is not flawless either. ASEAN needs to realize that BRI’s 
implementation seemed to be stagnant on several projects due to leadership regime changes (Zhexin, 
2018). ASEAN has the urgency in embracing solutions and enforce intra-regional partnerships to 
ensure a great cohesiveness inside to prevent any leakage of regional spirit when encountering 
external partners like China. With the absence of the United States from the RCEP, ASEAN can still 
ensure that China is not provoked directly on their yard with the US’ meddling on it.  
Conclusions  
Now it is going to be a matter of ASEAN perception, it is up to the region to perceive it as China’s 
good deeds or the other way around. One thing for sure, ASEAN shouldn’t overlook even the issues 
deemed insignificant. ASEAN should scrutinize the way it decides their own regional fate, because 
if it is not controlled then it will fail to rejuvenate the regional values. And any failure in coping up 
with the contemporary challenges will bring ASEAN policymaking into another stagnancy as 
experienced by another region in the world such as the African Union that was obstructed by 
overwhelming multidimensional challenges. The Pan Africanism movement that was resounded by 
the African Union through its megaphone diplomacy only gives contradicting results. We can see 
their prolonged bad governance has disabled the region from thriving in Pan African prosperity shared 
values. Therefore, ASEAN shouldn’t let the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific just standing there as 
a normative guidance without concrete efforts to defending it from external storms. In 2016 the region 
has been using their megaphone diplomacy to promote the shared vision stipulated within the Outlook 
on Indo-Pacific. Hence it is imperative for ASEAN to learn from the AU and overwhelming Beijing 
control that has caused the AU to lose their centrality. ASEAN’s determination should be designed 
with an ideal way of cooperative mechanism that can allow the ASEAN Way of regionalism to co-
exist with China’s growing interest, whilst putting various efforts in contributing to positive growth 
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and safe political space for ASEAN. The way of potectionism against China is not the best policy 
option seeing from the US – where the withdrawal of the US from CP-TPP has weakened its relation 
with Asian countries that “loves” their partnership with the US. This has opened wider space for 
China to explore and gives new hope and policy assistance for the member states who require 
development cooperation and financial assistance. ASEAN should cater its regional cooperation to 
ensure that they will not fall into another debt-trap diplomacy or being pulled by loan to surrender 
their sovereignty like what happened to other BRI countries like Sri Lanka. All for the preservation 
of ASEAN Way in a new integrated Asia Pacific statecraft in a multipolar world.  
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